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Abstract
In the 1970s and 1980s the state of Alaska invested millions of dollars to develop a large-scale agricultural industry. The 
Delta Barley Project and the Point MacKenzie Dairy Project 
were created to show that large-scale agriculture was possible 
in Alaska. This study looks at the major events and policy de-
cisions that occurred and determines how the outcome of the 
demonstration projects was affected. An extensive literature re-
view was conducted, focusing on state documents; key persons 
were also interviewed. The projects did not accomplish their 
original goals for a number of economic and political reasons. 
The positive aspects of development are that Alaska now has 
more land in private ownership, more infrastructure to support 
the industry, and a thriving agricultural community at Delta 
Junction.
Preface
The advancement of agriculture in Alaska in the 1970s and 1980s was considered one of the more important times 
for the Alaska agricultural industry. Numerous policy deci-
sions were made during that period that has shaped the current 
industry. This thesis charts the history of the large-scale state-
funded agricultural projects and identifies major events and 
management decisions. Through review of past agricultural 
management decisions, insight can be gained about the current 
state of agriculture in Alaska and what direction the industry 
is moving. This thesis will provide a historical overview of that 
era of development, as well as provide information to managers 
about past agricultural policy. 
Introduction 
In the late 1970s the State of Alaska developed a task force to address the advancement of an agricultural industry in 
Alaska. During this time the state had large budget surpluses 
due to incoming revenue from oil development on the North 
Slope (Lehne nd). The governor at the time established goals 
to develop renewable resource industries to spend oil revenues 
responsibly (AAAC 1981). During this time an exploratory soil 
survey was conducted, which identified over 20 million acres (8 
million ha) of land suitable for agriculture. It was decided that 
Delta Junction was a good place to start a project demonstrating 
Alaska’s capability for large-scale agriculture. The project land 
was sold through a lottery system and winners were put on a 
development schedule and given large loans to get their farms 
operating. Other tracts of land were surveyed for agricultural 
production, and a few years later the Point MacKenzie dairy 
demonstration project was auctioned at lottery, as well as the 
Delta expansion. Support facilities, such as meat processing 
plants and grain holding bins, were also planned and built.
The state spent millions of dollars to create this industry 
(Teal 1982), yet events took place that changed the intended 
outcome of the projects. It is still a controversial topic, as it 
is considered a blunder by some and a success by others. The 
objective of this study is to evaluate whether the major state-
funded agricultural projects of the late 1970s and early 1980s 
accomplished their original goals, and to assess how policy deci-
sions affected the outcome of the projects. 
Review of Previous Investigations
There have been few complete studies done on the long-
term effects of the agriculture projects. Many reports were 
published in the years directly following completion of the first 
phases of the projects, but most have failed to take a look at 
later, related events.. Geier and Lewis wrote in 1998 that farms 
may have been more successful had the state put smaller parcels 
up for lottery to “make it easier for initial success,” which may 
have allowed for further expansion of the industry. 
In 1987 Engelbrecht and Thomas conducted a study 
about how policy was implemented during this time. The study 
indicated that there were conflicting agency goals and poor co-
operation between the Division of Natural Resources (DNR) 
and the Alaska Agricultural Action Council (AAAC), which 
led to many complications during execution of the projects. 
Over time these conflicts led to decreased public support of the 
agricultural projects, and the political standing of the AAAC di-
minished. They concluded that “the degree of success achieved 
in implementing new policies is largely dependent on the ability 
of the power interests to negotiate or force change.” 
History of Alaska Agriculture
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Methods
I conducted an extensive literature review to reveal the 
history of the projects and state actions. Specifically, I re-
viewed state papers documenting the policies and actions since 
the 1970s. Documents from the AAAC were of particular 
importance. I analyzed statistical data from the Alaskan Agri-
cultural Statistics to ascertain the changes in production since 
the 1970s. I interviewed key personnel  to better understand 
various agencies’ actions and positions on the issues, as well as 
to obtain information that has not been formally documented. 
The State of Alaska Division of Natural Resources - Division 
of Agriculture and the University of Alaska Fairbanks School 
of Natural Resources and Agricultural Sciences data were par-
ticularly significant. I also interviewed various project farmers 
to understand the state’s actions from a producer’s point of view. 
I followed the University of Alaska Fairbanks’ Institutional Re-
view Board’s guidelines when conducting interviews.
History of Alaska Agriculture
Alaska has historically been a land of subsistence and the ‘hunting and gathering’ way of life. Agriculture was first 
introduced during the 1700s, when Europeans first colonized 
Alaska (Snodgrass et al. 1982). The Russians began many small 
agricultural colonies in such areas as Yakutat, Ninilchik, and 
Kasilof. Cattle were introduced to the state at this time also.
When gold was discovered in Alaska there was a revival 
of agriculture. Homesteads were established and the farmers 
began producing crops for the many prospectors that had mi-
grated into the state. By the time the gold rush had ended many 
permanent communities had already become established and 
were thriving. The Tanana Valley was the center of agricultural 
production up until the 1930s (Snodgrass et al. 1982). 
The Matanuska colony was President Roosevelt’s plan to 
breathe life into agriculture and revitalize people during the 
depression. In 1934, 202 impoverished families were relocated 
from the lower 48 states to Alaska (Lehne nd). During this time 
it was shown that agriculture was, in fact, viable in the state. The 
Matanuska Valley proved to be very capable of producing veg-
etable crops and became known for its dairy production. 
As the Soil Conservation Service began mapping the soils 
in Alaska in the mid twentieth century, many areas were identi-
fied as having potentially arable soils (Snodgrass et al. 1982). 
In the end the figure reached over 20 million acres (8 million 
ha) of land suitable for agriculture. The discovery that the state 
had so much agricultural soil led to the publication of Alaska’s 
Agricultural Production by the Alaska Rural Development 
Council and the idea of agricultural development again became 
an interest.
Plowing wheat in the Matanuska Valley, at the Matanuka Experiment Farm.
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Governor Hammond’s Alaska
Governor Jay Hammond entered into office in December of 
1974. This was a time of great wealth for the state following the 
discovery of oil at Prudhoe Bay in the 1960s. Governor Ham-
mond believed the state needed a “renewable resource economic 
base to sustain [Alaska]” after the oil was depleted (Lehne nd). 
In 1976 Governor Hammond established the following goals to 
encourage the development of renewable resources in the state, 
including agriculture: 
Broaden the economic base of the state through • 
agricultural production. 
Stabilize real food costs by increasing local food. • 
Provide alternative job opportunities through expanded • 
agriculture. 
Improve rural life by developing an economic base • 
through agriculture. 
Assist in meeting national goals of increased food • 
production for world needs.
(AAAC 1981)
These goals helped to shape future agricultural develop-
ment in the state.
In 1975, the Federal-State Land Use Planning Commission 
for Alaska conducted an in-depth study on the feasibility of 
agriculture in Alaska . They concluded that agriculture was pos-
sible in Alaska and recommended that “a large demonstration 
area be developed,” and that “efforts be made to designate a con-
siderable portion of land for agriculture” (Faris and Hildreth 
1975). This prompted Bob Palmer, Special Projects Coordina-
tor for Governor Hammond, to establish an ad hoc committee 
to address the study (Lehne nd). 
The committee investigated agricultural production and 
decided to focus on Delta Junction as the first project area. On 
August 5, 1978, 22 names were drawn by lottery for the oppor-
tunity to purchase agricultural rights to the demonstration area 
land, which totaled approximately 60,000 acres (24,281 ha). 
This marked the beginning of an era of large-scale state funded 
agricultural projects. 
In 1979 the AAAC was created to manage the Delta proj-
ect and recommend future projects to the legislature (AAAC 
1979). It was composed of five members, three people from the 
state government and two from the private sector. It was chaired 
by the Office of the Governor’s Special Projects Coordinator 
(AAAC 1979). This council was the influential body that made 
recommendations to the legislature, many of which were ulti-
mately funded and completed. 
The AAAC generated reasons why the state should support 
agricultural development. The five reasons are paraphrased as 
follows: 
Nonrenewable resource wealth must be used to develop • 
renewable resource industries.
Alaska has enough arable acreage to provide satisfying • 
work and an enjoyable lifestyle for many Alaskans. 
Alaska should not import 98% of red meat and depend • 
on a system that maintains only a four-day supply. 
Agriculture is an opportunity for rural people who • 
wish to remain on historic land and participate in the 
economy of the state.
The state can demonstrate that oil wealth is being used • 
responsibly.
(AAAC 1981)
The AAAC devised many projects to expand the agricul-
ture industry in Alaska. Additional projects were designed for 
land disposal, meat processing, grain handling, and transporta-
tion. Nearly all of the projects that the AAAC recommended to 
the legislature were funded, but not all were completed. It was 
also envisioned that 500,000 acres (202,343 ha) of land would 
be in cultivation by 1992 (AAAC 1982d).
The legislature was very supportive of agricultural devel-
opment for a number of years, and from 1978–1982 over $41 
million was appropriated to the various projects of the AAAC. 
In the mid 1980s the political climate changed, following certain 
setbacks of the projects and tightening fiscal constraints due to 
dropping oil prices (Lewis and Pearson 1990). Legislators be-
came more reluctant to fund agricultural development, possibly 
because they were unable to determine how their constituents felt 
about the projects (Snodgrass et al. 1982). At this time there was 
also skepticism from the public about the ability of the AAAC 
and DNR to implement the projects in the public’s best interests 
(Engelbrecht and Thomas 1987). Governor Bill Sheffield took 
office in 1982, and the administration’s support on the previous 
levels of development was much reduced (Lewis 2007).
In 1984, the effective life of the AAAC concluded and it 
was not renewed by the legislature. All of its duties reverted 
back to the Director of the Division of Agriculture (Fowler 
1992). Once the AAAC was inactivated no more projects were 
devised, and it marked the end of large-scale agricultural devel-
opment in Alaska. 
Delta
The Delta project was designed as an agricultural demon-
stration, and was intended to specialize in the production of 
small grains—particularly barley. The intent was to produce 
grains on a large scale to lower the cost of feed grains, which 
would in turn stimulate the livestock industry in Alaska (AAAC 
1982a). Delta was selected as the site for the large-scale demon-
stration for a number of reasons. Most important, there was a 
road system, large areas of state land were available for disposal, 
agriculture was already practiced there, and the community spe-
cifically asked for agricultural development in the area (Lewis 
and Wooding 1978). 
Barley was selected because it is a proven crop in Alaska 
and export markets had been identified to support the indus-
try. It can mature at cool temperatures and has a short growing 
Delta
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season, both of which are required for successful growth in 
Alaska (Lewis and Wooding 1978). According to studies, Alas-
ka land produced nearly twice as many bushels of barley per acre 
as the Great Plains area (Faris and Hildreth 1975). In Alaska’s 
Agricultural and Forestry Experiment Station trials, the high-
est yielding varieties averaged 76 to 80 bushels per acre (Lewis 
and Wooding 1978). The barley was expected to be purchased 
by the small in-state market and eventually to a larger Asian ex-
port market (AAAC 1981). The consensus at the time was that 
Alaska could be competitive with other regions for the Asian 
markets if the quality and price of the grain was comparable 
(Thomas 1979). 
Agricultural rights to the land of the Delta I project were 
sold by lottery on August 5, 1978. Twenty-two tracts were in-
cluded in the sale, averaging 2,600 acres (1,052 ha) per tract, for 
a total project area of 60,000 acres (24,281 ha) (AAAC 1981). 
Pre-qualified applicants in the lottery were required to be Alaska 
residents, have capital of their own to spend, and management 
ability (Lehne nd). After being selected in the lottery, winners 
were sold the agricultural rights to the land through the De-
partment of Natural Resources Division of Lands (Division of 
Legislative Audit 1991). Contracts and loans for land clearing 
and development were established between the lottery winner 
and the Governor’s Office, but contracts were later transferred 
to the AAAC. Additional loans for tract development were 
supplied by the Agricultural Revolving Loan Fund (ARLF). 
Since the landowners only purchased the ‘agricultural rights’ to 
the land, as opposed to a fee simple title, it was much harder 
to receive loans for capital investments ( Johnson 1984). Private 
lenders felt that loaning money for agricultural rights was too 
risky because the industry was unstable. 
An extension of the first Delta demonstration area was con-
ceived in 1979 and approved by the legislature in 1981 (AAAC 
1981). This extension, called Delta II, was to follow the same 
principles as Delta I and with the extension the state would be 
able to produce enough grain to support the infrastructure sur-
rounding processing, marketing, and transportation (AAAC 
1982b). On March 13, 1982, 24,600 acres (9,955 ha) in 15 
tracts were sold by outcry auction (AAAC 1982c). There were 
no pre-qualifications in the Delta II sale because it was deter-
mined by the state court to exceed the government’s authority 
(Engelbrecht and Thomas 1987). Originally the state had pro-
posed a sale of 55,000 acres (22,258 ha) in the expansion, but 
resource conflicts prompted postponement of the western por-
tion, called Delta II West (AAAC 1982a). There were concerns 
about using the land for timber, as opposed to agriculture, as 
well as concerns about the damage the buffalo herd could inflict 
on potential crops (Engelbrecht and Thomas 1987).
Clearing the land proceeded quickly, and planting crops 
began in 1980 (AAAC 1981). That year there were crop fail-
ures due to adverse weather conditions and predation by a local 
free-ranging buffalo herd, and the acreage planted produced on 
average 30 bushels per acre. While some farms had losses of 20 
to 50 percent (Lehne nd), some averaged over 75 bushels per 
acre (AAAC 1981). All of the grain produced that year, which 
was 6,000 tons, was sold in-state as livestock feed (AAAC 
1982b). The next year, weather, in the form of an early snow, 
again caused crop loss. Grasshopper infestations also accounted 
for crop losses during the formative years (Hollembaek 2007). 
It is probable that these events contributed to the public’s doubt 
about the capability of the project to succeed.
As grain production increased, so did the demand for in-
state livestock feed (Lehne nd). The plan was to begin export 
of barley once there was a reasonable surplus, but as in-state de-
mand increased, the date for export was delayed. At this time 
there was still no export grain elevator, and in 1983 the Divi-
sion of Agriculture (DOAg) suggested that construction of 
the grain terminal be put on hold until production exceeded 
in-state markets and Alaska barley could be competitive with 
the world market (DOAg 1983). In the end the Seward export 
terminal was never completed and the dream of a large export 
market was not realized.
Also during this time the price of barley, and other agri-
cultural crops, began declining internationally (Division of 
Legislative Audit 1986). The drop in international prices made 
imported grain cheaper than barley produced in Alaska (Lewis 
and Pearson 1990). Too little barley was being produced to 
Barley harvest  in Delta.
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export, and prices were too low for that to be an economical 
solution. As debt mounted, the number of farmers in Delta 
began decreasing (Division of Legislative Audit 1986). Farm-
ers looked to in-state markets, but it was hard to compete with 
low prices from the lower 48 states. Some farmers thought that 
the state was responsible for the mounting debt because certain 
infrastructure, such as the export grain terminal, had never been 
completed and was deemed essential to the success of the farms 
in the University of Alaska’s feasibility study and by the Alaska 
Agricultural Action Council. An investigation by the Division 
of Legislative Audit showed that farmers would be unable to 
have debt relieved by filing a lawsuit because the state had never 
guaranteed funding for additional infrastructure. 
In 1990 the debt owed to the state by Delta project farmers 
totaled over $53 million, in 1990 dollars (Division of Legis-
lative Audit 1991). The state began to restructure loans with 
farmers to see some return on its investment. The programs for 
debt restructuring were generally unavailable to landowners 
participating in federal assistance programs, such as the Con-
servation Reserve Program (CRP), that paid to keep land out 
of production. It was felt by some that the restructuring process 
was very subjective, and the way it was carried out created dis-
trust of the ARLF.
By 1998 only seven of the original 37 landowners from 
both projects still retained ownership of their parcels (Geier and 
Lewis 1998). The rest of the parcels had either been sold by the 
original tract owner or foreclosed upon and resold by the state. 
Some of the large tracts that reverted back to state ownership 
were then subdivided and sold, which put farmers on smaller 
parcels. Original project farmers who had retained ownership 
of their land were likely involved in the Conservation Reserve 
Program or had needed less initial capital investment and there-
fore accumulated lower amounts of debt (Hollembaek 2007). 
Currently there are 56 Delta farmers on 29,000 acres (11,736 
ha) enrolled in the CRP received a combined annual payment 
of $949,703 (Huelskotter, Pers. Comm. 20071). 
Delta Junction currently has a diverse agricultural com-
munity, though it is not as was envisioned at inception of the 
Delta Project. There are still farms that are producing tradition-
al crops and livestock, as well as other farms that are producing 
alternative livestock and niche market crops, and it is viewed as 
an agricultural community. The goal of a large export market 
for small grains was never achieved and the export elevator at 
Seward was never completed. This, coupled with falling grain 
prices, led to farmers being unable to survive economically. 
Original project farmers either sold their land or tried to enter 
different markets. Those who survived and have remained in 
Delta are extremely loyal to the community and are supportive 
of the agricultural development that has occurred there. 
Point MacKenzie
Point MacKenzie was designed as a dairy project to sup-
ply the Anchorage market, as well as to use the livestock feed 
being produced in Delta (Snodgrass et al. 1982). The dairy in-
dustry depends heavily on infrastructure and other industries, 
so it was assumed that a revitalized dairy industry would create 
jobs and boost the local economy. There was once a relatively 
large dairy industry in Alaska, but during the 1960s many farms 
either consolidated or went out of business. By expanding the 
existing industry it was believed that the production of dairy 
products would become more feasible through an economy of 
scale (AAAC 1979). Point MacKenzie was designed as a 15,000 
acre (6,070 ha) project with 31 tracts, 19 of which were des-
ignated as dairies and 12 others that were to be supplemental 
farms for growing feed and other crops (AAAC 1981). 
A feasibility study was conducted in 1980 that estimated 
the productivity of dairy operations at Point MacKenzie (Lewis 
et al. 1980). According to the study a farm could achieve a posi-
tive cash flow by the second year in operation, assuming that the 
price paid to the farmers remained at or above $16.84 per cwt 
(one hundred pounds of milk). The authors also stated the dairy 
industry could only grow if the farmers used best management 
1. E-mail dated 18 April 2007 from Helga Huelskoetter. Program Techni-
cian, Farm Service Agency Northern County.
Dairy cattle in Delta.
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practices and if the processing sector became more efficient. 
The project was scheduled for sale March 6, 1981 (Fowler 
1992). The lottery took place, but was later thrown out by the 
court based on the fact that the state had required a farm con-
servation plan or dairy farming experience to qualify, which was 
deemed to be exceeding the state’s own authority (Englebrecht 
and Thomas 1987). Two tracts were not included in the law-
suit because they were Matanuska-Susitna Borough land, and 
remained with the original lottery winner. Another lottery was 
held in September 1982, and this time no previous dairy farm-
ing experience was required to be considered for the lottery. The 
winners signed contracts that gave them agricultural rights to 
the land and established deadlines for land clearing, crop pro-
duction, and production of milk. 
Under the contract signed for the loans, farmers were ex-
pected to clear land, begin producing crops, and start milking 
cows in three years (Fowler 1992). At the start of the project 
milk prices were high, around $22 cwt, and farmers felt confi-
dent in their investments. By 1983 one farm had already begun 
producing milk and the others were clearing property in an-
ticipation of milking cows. Milk was being sold to Matanuska 
Maid, the oldest milk processor in the state. Matanuska Maid 
is located in Anchorage and was a major catalyst in beginning 
the Point MacKenzie project (Lewis et al. 1980). At the end of 
1983, Matanuska Maid was unable to repay its debts and filed 
for bankruptcy and the price paid to producers immediately 
dropped (Fowler 1992). These events brought public attention 
to instability in the dairy industry. 
The loan limit from the Argicultral Revolving Loan Fund 
was capped at $1 million, and some farmers were already at or 
near this limit (Fowler 1992). Many farmers had initially invest-
ed in expensive barns, which left little or no money for other 
expenses, such as cows and equipment. The increased debt load 
made farms less likely to be successful.
Farmers had trouble staying on schedule, but were told the 
schedule was inflexible. Around this time the state took owner-
ship of Matanuska Maid, which was deemed necessary to keep 
the dairy industry operating (Van Treeck 2006). The ARLF 
previously loaned $4.5 million to Matanuska Maid (Division of 
Audit and Management Services 1990), but even more compel-
ling was the investment made in the dairies at Point MacKenzie. 
Without the processor, the state believed the dairy industry 
it was trying to create would inevitably fail (Alaska Ombuds-
man 1989). Matanuska Maid, because it was state owned, was 
required to purchase all the milk produced that met quality 
standards (Fowler 1992). Though most farmers faced financial 
challenges, milk was being produced in significant quantities 
by 1986, so much so that Matanuska Maid stopped importing 
milk, but at the same time their sales were down. 
During this time the Matanuska area was going through a 
recession (Alaska Ombudsman 1989). Unemployment rates in 
the area rose to 12 percent, and bankruptcies increased 250 per-
cent through 1984. Businesses in the area had to downsize and 
cut costs to survive. Local feed suppliers were unable to supply 
Point MacKenzie farmers because most could not afford to buy 
feed with cash, and suppliers were not willing to accept their 
credit. Farmers in the Point MacKenzie project began having 
problems repaying debt and keeping their dairies operating. As 
production decreased in 1988, Matanuska Maid began import-
ing milk again. By 1990 over 50 percent of Matanuska Maid’s 
milk was being imported, and coincidentally their sales began 
rising (Fowler 1992).
As of 1992, only two dairy producers remained at Point 
MacKenzie (Fowler 1992). This number has fluctuated through 
the years, but has stayed steady with at least one producer in 
Point MacKenzie at any time. The Point MacKenzie dairy proj-
ect did not meet the expectations envisioned by the state. Some 
of the landowners at Point MacKenzie invested in the land as 
speculators, waiting to sell when the agricultural zones are lifted 
and the Knik Bridge is built (Fowler 1992). Instead of creat-
ing a sustainable industry, the state instead became owner of the 
primary milk processor in southcentral Alaska and watched as 
most of the dairy farms at Point MacKenzie underwent financial 
trouble and eventually failed. As dairies from Point MacKenzie 
defaulted on debts and went out of business, Matanuska Maid 
began importing more milk from out of state. Currently there 
are only nine grade A dairies in the state, down from sixteen 
at the height of Point MacKenzie’s production in 1986 (Alaska 
Agricultural Statistics Service 1976–2006). 
Nenana-Totchaket
The Nenana-Totchaket area has been considered an area 
with some of the most prime agricultural soils in the state 
(AAAC 1981). The proposed project was located west of the 
city of Nenana in a remote area. The original thought was that 
the producers would be linked to markets through the adja-
cent railroad, and agriculture would begin to expand westward. 
The Natural Resource Conservation Service (NRCS) (at that 
time the Soil Conservation Service) identified 175,000 acres 
(70,820 ha) of agricultural soils in the area between the Tanana 
and Kantishna Rivers. The feasibility study conducted assumed 
that this project would be much like Delta and be a small grain-
producing area (AAAC 1982a). 
In 1980 the legislature appropriated $500,000 for design 
and development of the project. In 1982 the AAAC asked the 
legislature to fund further development of the project and that 
a lottery sale for 75,000 acres (30,351 ha) take place as soon 
as possible (AAAC 1982a). In 1983 the Division of Agricul-
ture suggested that the sale be delayed until analysis of the 
previous projects had been completed, to help determine if the 
investments needed to complete the Nenana-Totchaket project 
would result in sufficient benefits to Alaska (DOAg 1983). It 
is possible that funding for a bridge and access to the remote 
location was more than the legislature was willing to do, because 
no more appropriations were made and the project was never 
completed (Lewis 2007). 
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Infrastructure
The infrastructure proposed, which would support the 
grain, dairy, and red meat industries, was seen as a “vital link 
between the producer and the consumer” (AAAC 1979). It was 
viewed as essential to the economic success of the projects that 
certain facilities were in place. To make the facilities available to 
the producer quickly, the AAAC knew the facilities would have 
to be government owned and managed for a period, but felt that 
“as soon as possible, the ownership and management function 
should be transferred to the private sector” (AAAC 1979).
A grain elevator at port was considered a necessity to the 
success of a small grain export industry. Seward was selected as 
the preferred city for its location because it was connected to the 
railroad system (Lewis 2007). Under this plan, grain trucked to 
Fairbanks from Delta would be loaded on rail cars and travel to 
Seward, stopping along the way to deposit grain for livestock 
producers in various towns (AAAC 1982a). The AAAC recom-
mended that the legislature spend $6.5 million to construct the 
terminal elevator. 
Construction of the grain terminal began in 1981. The 
legality of the AAAC hiring contractors and leasing land was 
questioned, and work was halted later that year (Division of 
Internal Audit 1981, AAAC 1982a). Once Governor Sheffield 
took office no additional appropriations were made to fund the 
construction and the terminal elevator was never realized (Lew-
is 2007). Despite the $6.5 million invested, the state placed 
further grain terminal appropriations on hold until there was 
increased production to support it (AAAC 1983). It is also pos-
sible the state thought the terminal being built in Valdez would 
be suitable, and did not wish to fund a redundant facility (Ham-
mond 1994). That additional investment never materialized 
and the Seward facility is currently a concrete pad still owned 
by the state and used for various purposes, none of which are 
grain exportation (Lewis 2007).
The city of Valdez began construction of a grain termi-
nal concurrently with the Seward project. The city of Valdez 
thought that it should be the place of grain export since all the 
oil from the North Slope was being shipped out from the same 
location. The state did not support a grain terminal at Valdez be-
cause it was not a part of the railroad system (Lewis 2007), but 
Valdez built one regardless. The building site was chosen poorly, 
and the terminal needed approximately $500,000 in dredging 
to allow barges close enough to load grain (Alaska Cooperative 
Extension Service 2006). No grain was ever exported using the 
Valdez grain terminal.
A livestock processing facility was also deemed necessary to 
“complete the feed grain-livestock cycle” (AAAC 1981). Live-
stock numbers were expected to increase as grain production 
increased, and the existing slaughterhouses at the time would 
be unable to accommodate for the growth. The legislature ap-
propriated $2.65 million for the development of these facilities 
(AAAC 1982a), in the form of loans to private builders (Teal 
1982). A slaughterhouse was built in Fairbanks, but it was 
leased and later sold to Interior Alaska Fish Processors with-
out ever being used for livestock slaughter (Knight 2007). Mt. 
McKinley Meat and Sausage (MMMS) was built in Palmer and 
began operation in December of 1983 (AAAC 1983). 
The Palmer facility was designed to handle 100 hogs per 
day and 50 cattle. It stayed in operation for two years, but was 
foreclosed by the Agriculture Revolving Loan Fund in 1985 
(Torgerson et al. 2003). The facility remained closed until 1987, 
when the Department of Corrections reopened it to use for re-
habilitation and training of inmates. The MMMS continued to 
lose money and was unable to cover its operating expenses. In 
2002 MMMS was able to cover operating expenses, but it was 
still unable to cover other expenses, such as wages. This was the 
closest it had come to being economical since its inception. 
In 2002 the Division of Agriculture developed a request for 
proposals that would allow for a $1 per year lease to operate 
MMMS in an attempt to get the losing venture out of state 
control. Although there was a lot of interest in the proposal 
request, no one submitted a responsive proposal and MMMS 
remained state operated. MMMS debt is paid out of the ARLF, 
which is steadily decreasing in funds and entirely pays for the 
operation of the Division of Agriculture, so the division has 
continually tried to decrease expenses and transfer the facility to 
private ownership (Torgerson et al. 2003). It has been suggested 
in the past that the facility be shut down, but the state recognizes 
the need that MMMS meets for the community. Currently 
MMMS remains under state ownership and management, and 
steps are still being taken to minimize expenses and reduce losses 
(DeVilbiss 2006). 
A grain handling facility was constructed in 1980 in Del-
ta Junction that provided an elevator, drying, and storage for 
Delta grain producers (AAAC 1981). It cost approximately 
$1,300,000 in loans to a private business to construct, and had 
to be expanded almost immediately to deal with all the grain 
being produced in Delta. In 1985, when grain production 
dropped dramatically, it was foreclosed upon by the state (Alas-
ka Cooperative Extension Service 2006). Currently it is owned 
by the ARLF, but is leased for $1 a year by the Alaska Farmers 
Cooperative, Inc. It is used for grain and fertilizer storage for 
farmers in the Tanana Valley. 
Analysis
Through the years the Alaska state government spent mil-
lions of dollars to create a large scale agricultural industry. In 
appropriations alone, over $76 million, in 2006 dollars, was 
spent on the projects (Table 1). Even more millions of dollars 
were spent on the ARLF loans to farmers. It is debatable wheth-
er the funds expended were worth the benefits created. It is 
interesting to note that appropriations made to Delta I spanned 
a period of a few years, whereas all infrastructure appropriations 
came in a lump sum in one year.
Analysis
9
The projects increased overall commodity production in 
the state for a period of time. Total acres planted in crops rose 
during the period that the Delta project was created (Fig 1). 
Represented in the total cropland are many agronomic crops, 
such as hay, oats, and grass, and acreage dedicated to those com-
modities was highest during the projects’ initial years. Acres in 
cropland dropped after a few years, in the mid 1980s. This was 
when farmers at the Delta project were going through finan-
cial troubles, and the international price of grains had dropped. 
The peak in 1984 of 41,000 acres (16,592 ha) has not since 
been reached. It is important to note that acreage in cropland 
Table 1. Direct Appropriations made by the Alaska Legislature, 1978–1982 (in 2006 $)
Project  Year* Total
  1978 1979 1980 1981 1982   
Delta I $11,296,253 $14,844,849 $3,671,072 $1,595,762 0 $31,407,936
Delta II 0 0 0 $15,136,876 0  $15,136,876
Point MacKenzie 0 0 $9,223,568 0 $392,286 $9,615,854
Nenana-Totchaket 0 0 $917,768 $840,760 0 $1,758,528
Infrastructure† 0 0 0 $18,748,949 0  $18,748,949
$76,668,143
*PPI (all commodities), not seasonally adjusted, normalized to 2006
† includes processing facilities, export terminal, rail hopper cars, and marketing
Source: Teal, D. 1982. Financing agricultural projects in Alaska. Juneau: State of Alaska, House Research Agency 
report 81-5
is presently at higher levels than before the agricultural projects 
were established. The 100,000 acres (40,469 ha) of project land 
put into private ownership appears to have made an impact 
on agricultural production, but not to the extent that was en-
visioned. The AAAC had a goal that 500,000 acres (202,343 
ha) would be in production by 1992, and this obviously did not 
occur. 
Acreage planted in barley increased dramatically in the 
years following the lottery for Delta I, but started to decline 
in the mid 1980s (Fig 2). The decline is due to a combination 
of factors, including dropping grain prices, farmer turnover, 
Figure 1. Alaska Cropland Utilization, 1976-2005. Source: Alaska Agricultural Statistics Service 1977–2006. 
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Figure 2. Alaska Acreage Planted in Barley, years 1975-2005. Source: Alaska Agricultural Statistics Service 1976–2006. 
Figure 3. Alaska Cash Receipts for Barley, 1976–2005. PPI (all commodities), not seasonally adjusted, normalized to 2006 
dollars. Source: Alaska Agricultural Statistics Service 1978–2006.
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and land being devoted to the Conservation Reserve Program. 
Barley production acreage has not fallen back to the low levels 
before 1978 and has remained between 4,000 and 8,000 acres 
(1,619-3,237 ha) over the past ten years. The projects affected 
barley production, but did not reach the expectations of the 
planners. The industry was supposed to grow to completely fill 
the in-state need and the surplus was to be sold on the world 
market. However, as prices dropped and production decreased 
the terminal was put on hold.
The cash receipts paid to farmers for barley peaked in 1984, 
at over $2 million (Fig 3). Considering that each project farmer 
owed close to or over a million dollars, it is clear why many farm-
ers were unable to pay back their debts. Nationally, barley prices 
were high during the planning stages of the Delta I project, but 
have been on a downward trend since 1974 (Fig 4). It is interest-
ing that barley prices had already began dropping when the ad 
hoc committee designed and created the Delta I project.
The level of milk production rose significantly during 
the late 1980s (Fig 5, p. 12). This rise can be attributed to the 
increased production from the Point MacKenzie project. Land-
owners were receiving large loans to bring farms into production 
swiftly, and some were quickly reaching the $1 million loan 
limit. The rapid rise in production began in 1984 and peaked 
in 1987 at 35,000,000 lbs. of milk produced in the state of Alas-
ka. The increase envisioned by the project’s creators in Alaska 
milk production was short lived, and by 1987 milk production 
began dropping. The decrease in production can be attributed 
to the numerous financial troubles that plagued area farmers, 
which led to foreclosures. Since 1991 production has remained 
relatively stable and comparable to production before the Point 
MacKenzie dairy project was established. 
Based on the statistical data it is clear that project commod-
ity production increased during the initial years of development, 
but drastically dropped in the mid to late 1980s. As farms in the 
Delta area accrued debt and were foreclosed upon, those acres 
went out of production. Many farms on Delta project land 
were placed into the Conservation Reserve Program (Knight 
2007), which also accounts for the decrease in barley acreage. 
Milk production increased rapidly as farms were being subsi-
dized and large investments were made to quickly begin milk 
production. Milk production decreased as debt mounted and 
farms were abandoned. The ‘boom and bust’ cycle exhibited by 
barley and milk production is indicative that the project goals 
were not achieved and that the projects were not sustainable, 
which is due to a number of factors.
Discussion
Governor Hammond had grand ideas about the creation 
of an agricultural industry from oil profits. The goals of his ad-
ministration were to broaden the economic base of the state 
Figure 4. Barley Prices for the United States, North Dakota, and Alaska. Dollars per bushel, 1970–2006. PPI (all commodi-
ties), not seasonally adjusted, normalized to 2006 dollars. Source: USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service
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through agricultural production, stabilize real food costs by 
increasing local food, provide alternative job opportunities 
through expanded agriculture, improve rural life by develop-
ing an economic base through agriculture, and assist in meeting 
national goals of increased food production for world needs. 
Examination of the outcomes provides little evidence that any 
of these goals were achieved.
Agriculture is a minor component of Alaska’s economy. 
Governor Hammond once said he believed “it is in fact possible 
that Alaska will be the prime agricultural state in the not too 
distant future” (Lehne nd). While Alaska does have dedicated 
farmers and agriculturalists, the industry is nowhere near the 
industrial scale that was envisioned in the design of the projects. 
Agriculture as an industry currently makes up less that one per-
cent of the revenues earned from all resource industries in the 
state (Alaska Cooperative Extension Service 2006).
An increase in local food production has occurred, but not 
to the extent that was envisioned. Washington State is still the 
primary supplier of milk to the state, supplemented by the small 
amount produced in-state. Currently there are two milk bottlers 
in the state, Matanuska Maid and Northern Lights Dairy (Van 
Treeck 2006). 2 Northern Lights Dairy is located in Delta and 
uses only Alaska milk (Lewis and Pearson 1990). As of 1998, 
Matanuska Maid processed about 30 percent Alaska milk, 
with the rest imported (Division of Legislative Audit 1998). 
Alaska red meat production has increased since the 1970s, but 
so has the population of Alaska. The state still imports about 
2. Editors’ note: now one, since Matanuska Maid was shut down at the 
end of 2007 and is scheduled for sale.
95 percent of its food (Alaska Cooperative Extension Service 
2006), and increases in commodity production have probably 
been only enough to counteract population growth and keep 
food importation at the levels it was in the 1970s. 
The development of Alaska agriculture came along as the 
importation of commodities was becoming more efficient. 
Currently there are no price incentives for Alaska to become 
self-sufficient, considering how the markets have changed 
and how effectively air and land transport have brought food 
and products to Alaska (Division of Legislative Audit 1998). 
Though this system is not infallible, as adverse circumstances 
can slow or stop transportation, it has worked well enough that 
Alaska has not substantially decreased its dependence on im-
porting food.
As far as improving rural life by developing an economic 
base through agriculture and assisting in meeting goals of in-
creased food production, this simply did not occur. Although 
the local economy of Delta has been affected by the agriculture 
practiced there, based on commodity production it is doubtful 
the Matanuska Valley’s economy is greatly affected by the Point 
MacKenzie development. Nenana-Totchaket was never com-
pleted, so development of a western Alaska agriculture economy 
was not accomplished. Grain production never reached the lev-
els that had been imagined and the export terminal was never 
finished, so Alaska does not play a role in meeting world grain 
needs. 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the rest of the United 
States was experiencing a farm crisis (Public Agenda Founda-
tion 1987). A third of the nation’s farmers were experiencing 
Figure 5. Alaska Milk Production, years 1975–2005. Source: Alaska Agricultural Statistics Service 1976–2006. 
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financial troubles due to falling land values, low commodity 
prices, and mounting debt. The fiscal policies of the Carter and 
Reagan administrations escalated farmers’ problems because the 
industry is extremely capital intensive, dependent on interest 
rates and heavily subsidized (Buttel 1989). Declines in United 
States commodity prices, including small grains, began in 1984 
(Buttel 1989), which happens to be the peak year of Alaska bar-
ley production (Alaska Agricultural Statistics Service 1985). 
Alaska’s attempt at creating an agriculture industry happened 
to coincide with this arduous time in American agriculture, 
from which it could not have benefited. Alaska farmers were at 
more of a disadvantage because the project land was bought at 
a time when agricultural lands had reached peak values, and it 
still took a few years of clearing and capital investment before 
the farmer could begin producing crops and making money 
(DOAg 1985). 
There are federal government programs that have the poten-
tial to help stabilize commodity prices. The Commodity Credit 
Corporation (CCC) is managed by the Farm Service Agency 
(FSA), and its major functions are preservation of farm prices 
and income, as well as maintenance of supplies and balanced 
distribution of agricultural commodities.3 Programs such as 
this could have helped to stabilize barley prices during the Delta 
project’s formative years, but many farmers did not use the pro-
gram. Some of the programs require a licensed grain elevator in 
the state for eligibility, which leaves Alaska’s grain industry at a 
disadvantage (Alaska Cooperative Extension Service 2006). 
The Conservation Reserve Program is one government pro-
gram that helped farmers retain control of their land (Knight 
2007). By paying farmers to keep ‘conservation covers’ on their 
land the farmers did not have to invest in capital for high-risk 
crop production that may not be of suitable quality or quantity 
to make land payments. This land was not under cultivation, 
and was set aside as wildlife habitat, which allowed some land-
owners to receive an income without actually farming the land 
(Geier and Lewis 1998). 
The agricultural projects were created using a system that 
was very governmentally ‘hands on’ (Lewis and Pearson 1990). 
The land was made available by the state, the state gave loans to 
landowners to develop farms, and the state invested millions of 
dollars to build support facilities that were supposed to boost 
the industry. Eventually, administration changes coupled with 
project setbacks and tightening fiscal constraints due to drop-
ping oil prices led to less political and financial support for the 
government-funded projects. Legislators began asking when 
“enough is enough” and how much more money should be 
expended on the agricultural projects (Lehne nd). Lewis and 
Pearson noted in their 1990 study that a “hands-off model” of 
agricultural development would probably be most successful in 
Alaska. This model has been exhibited by the vegetable indus-
try, especially potatoes and carrots. The vegetable industry uses 
a smaller land base than grains, but received $4.7 million in cash 
3. Farm Service Agency website. Commodity Credit Corporation. http://
www.fsa.usda.gov/FSA/webapp?area=about&subject=landing&topic=s
ao-cc
receipts in 2005, compared with $787,000 for barley and oats 
(Alaska Agricultural Statistics Service 2006). 
The trend in Alaska agriculture has shifted from tradition-
al large-scale farms to smaller farms that produce for a niche 
market (Alaska Cooperative Extension Service 2006). Farm-
ers’ markets that supply local products to local consumers are 
growing statewide. There is room for growth in the alternative 
livestock industry, which emphasizes animals that are both well 
suited to Alaska and are a high value commodity. Currently, the 
most lucrative agricultural businesses in Alaska are greenhouses 
and aquaculture. The most traditional agronomic crop receiv-
ing the highest cash receipts is hay, which is mostly being used 
by recreational horse owners (Alaska Cooperative Extension 
Service 2006, Alaska Agricultural Statistics Service 2006). 
The Delta project failed at creating a sustainable large-scale 
grain industry in Alaska. There have been positive outcomes 
from the Delta development, such as the agricultural commu-
nity that has grown there. Dr. Lewis, Dean of the University 
of Alaska Fairbanks School of Natural Resources and Agricul-
tural Sciences and co-author of the Delta and Point MacKenzie 
feasibility studies, has stated that the Delta project has shown 
that agriculture in Alaska is possible under certain conditions, 
and that it can be successful (2007), though the level of success 
envisioned in the large-scale agricultural projects has obviously 
not been achieved. The project did put large amounts of state-
owned land into private ownership, and most of it is still being 
used for some type of agricultural enterprise. 
The Point MacKenzie project has less success to show for 
all the money that was invested in it. Only two dairies remained 
in 1992 out of nineteen that were proposed, one of which was 
an original lottery winner (Fowler 1992). Point MacKenzie had 
many problems, such as lawsuits and the bankruptcy of Mata-
nuska Maid, which hindered success. It is troubling that the state 
did not anticipate Matanuska Maid’s impending bankruptcy. 
The project had been underway for less than a year before the 
processor declared bankruptcy. Probably the most detrimental 
factor to the project’s success was the development time scale 
imposed on farmers. The project was designed with a develop-
ment schedule that was too fast for nearly all of the farmers. 
They built up large amounts of debt quickly and were either un-
able to stay on schedule or make payments due to the decrease 
in milk prices. Lottery winners were not required to have dairy 
experience, and as such were unprepared for the circumstances 
that followed. 
The Point MacKenzie project was based on numerous as-
sumptions from the University of Alaska’s feasibility study that 
did not materialize after inception. It was assumed that milk 
prices of $16.84 cwt would be sufficient for farmers to make a 
profit. However, later studies showed that the Point MacKenzie 
dairies needed up to $50.90 cwt to support their capital invest-
ments (Fowler 1992), which is an alarming difference. It was 
envisioned that Point MacKenzie farmers would be able to buy 
grain from the Delta project, but as grain prices dropped and 
farms pulled out of production, that was never realized. Land 
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clearing costs were underestimated, which led to farmers quick-
ly reaching their $1 million loan limit, along with excessive 
amounts being invested in capital expenses. Parts of the feasibil-
ity study were unrealistic, and it led to overoptimism about the 
potential risks and investments involved.
The Point MacKenzie project was envisioned as a large-
scale dairy project, just as Delta was designed as a large-scale 
grain industry. The successes of the projects are that 100,000 
acres (40,469 ha) have been transferred to private ownership 
and that there are now support facilities available to producers, 
even though most are state owned. In both cases, experience of 
the farmers was limited and large capital investments were either 
required or advocated, before profits could be achieved. Events 
not predicted by the development councils, such as adverse 
weather, deceased commodity values, and political decisions 
were detrimental to the outcome of the projects. 
Based on the information and sources available, some les-
sons can be learned from the state-funded agricultural projects. 
The way that the projects were planned and carried out was 
instrumental to the outcome. The ideas proposed were grand 
and designed on an immense scale. Generally, creating an in-
dustry such as this would take generations to accomplish, but 
the planners tried to create it in a short time. Administration 
changes proved volatile for the projects in their formative years, 
and those routine changes of the political climate were not con-
ducive to industry growth. Not only was there a high rate of 
farmer turnover, but project administrators also came and went, 
which created a loss of continuity. 
There were setbacks in the early years, which were poten-
tially minor events, but administrators saw this as a mark of 
failure, lessening their support for additional funding. It seemed 
as though some administrators were willing to cut their losses 
when the projects did not go exactly as planned. The industry 
was designed on an intricate scale with many interconnected 
parts, and each piece depended on the others. As certain parts 
fell though, such as the Seward Grain Terminal and the Mata-
nuska Maid bankruptcy, the chance of success for the rest of the 
projects decreased. Government can create a climate to encour-
age industry growth, but it is inappropriate for government to 
entirely fund and create an industry. 
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Appendix B: Raw Data
Table 1. Direct appropriations made by the Alaska Legislature 1978-1982
Project Year Total
 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982  
Delta I 4,793,000 7,089,900 2,000,000 949,000 0 14,831,900
Delta II 0 0 0 9,001,900 0 9,001,900
Point MacKenzie 0 0 5,025,000 0 238,000 5,263,000
Nenana-Totchaket 0 0 500,000 500,000 0 1,000,000
Infrastructure* 0 0 0 11,150,000 0 11,150,000
TOTAL: 41,246,800
*includes processing facilities, export terminal, rail hopper cars, and marketing
Source: Teal, D. 1982. Financing agricultural projects in Alaska. Juneau: State of Alaska, House Research 
Agency report 81-5
Figure 2. Alaska Acreage Planted in 
Barley, years 1975–2005
year acres planted
1975 1,600
1976 1,400
1977 3,100
1978 4,300
1979 6,500
1980 14,000
1981 16,500
1982 8,500
1983 16,000
1984 17,500
1985 13,000
1986 8,000
1987 6,000
1988 5,300
1989 5,100
1990 5,700
1991 5,200
1992 3,500
1993 4,700
1994 6,600
1995 7,500
1996 7,200
1997 7,200
1998 7,100
1999 5,400
2000 5,300
2001 5,800
2002 4,200
2003 4,000
2004 4,600
2005 4,600
Figure 1. Alaska Cropland 
Utilization, 1976–2005
year acres
1976 19017
1977 19005
1978 20181
1979 20432
1980 30484
1981 36881
1982 25284
1983 34671
1984 41503
1985 36351
1986 30040
1987 29134
1988 26344
1989 22422
1990 24200
1991 25653
1992 23016
1993 27758
1994 28940
1995 30726
1996 31322
1997 31064
1998 34184
1999 31340
2000 28256
2001 33903
2002 31095
2003 31807
2004 31312
2005 29895
Figure 5. Alaska Milk Production, 
years 1975–2005
year lbs (1,000)
1975 16,800
1976 16,000
1977 16,400
1978 14,800
1979 13,000
1980 12,500
1981 13,400
1982 13,800
1983 13,500
1984 13,900
1985 22,200
1986 31,500
1987 34,800
1988 30,700
1989 23,300
1990 16,800
1991 13,300
1992 12,200
1993 11,900
1994 12,600
1995 11,900
1996 13,500
1997 15,000
1998 14,300
1999 13,600
2000 13,050
2001 14,360
2002 17,680
2003 16,700
2004 14,600
2005 13,500
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Figure 3. Alaska Cash Receipts for Barley, 1977–2005. 
PPI (all commodities), not seasonally adjusted, 
normalized to 2006.
year barley cash 
receipts
PPI 2006 $
1976 217,000 0.3708 585,221
1977 364,000 0.3935 925,032
1978 496,000 0.4243 1,168,984
1979 783,000 0.4776 1,639,447
1980 886,000 0.5448 1,626,285
1981 869,000 0.5947 1,461,241
1982 997,000 0.6067 1,643,316
1983 1,059,000 0.6142 1,724,194
1984 1,409,000 0.6289 2,240,420
1985 557,000 0.6257 890,203
1986 373,000 0.6077 613,790
1987 442,000 0.6237 708,674
1988 581,000 0.6487 895,637
1989 636,000 0.6809 934,058
1990 264,000 0.7055 374,203
1991 634,000 0.7069 896,874
1992 362,000 0.7109 509,214
1993 419,000 0.7214 580,815
1994 509,000 0.7307 696,592
1995 951,000 0.7569 1,256,441
1996 646,000 0.7746 833,979
1997 465,000 0.7741 600,698
1998 301,000 0.7548 398,781
1999 459,000 0.7612 602,995
2000 325,000 0.8053 403,576
2001 602,000 0.8141 739,467
2002 455,000 0.7954 572,039
2003 437,000 0.838 521,480
2004 450,000 0.8898 505,732
2005 660,000 0.9549 691,172
Figure 4. Barley Prices for the United States, ND, and 
AK. $/bushel, 1970-2006. PPI (all commodities), not 
seasonally adjusted, normalized to 2006.
 $/bu $/bu $/bu
PPI** Year US ND AK
0.223874 1970 $4.35 $3.75 $8.49
0.231205 1971 $4.29 $3.37 $8.00
0.241418 1972 $5.01 $4.31 $8.08
0.273169 1973 $7.83 $7.65 $13.18
0.324486 1974 $8.66 $9.55 $12.79
0.354416 1975 $6.83 $7.19 $11.57
0.370898 1976 $6.07 $6.04 $10.52
0.393599 1977 $4.52 $3.91 $9.65
0.424339 1978 $4.52 $4.19 $8.96
0.477628 1979 $4.75 $4.40 $6.28
0.544871 1980 $5.12 $4.92 $5.51
0.594772 1981 $4.17 $3.70 $6.89
0.606805 1982 $3.59 $2.90 $5.93
0.614288 1983 $4.02 $3.58 $5.37
0.629 1984 $3.64 $3.08 $4.85
0.625815 1985 $3.16 $2.56 $4.63
0.607715 1986 $2.65 $2.25 $4.11
0.623742 1987 $2.90 $2.73 $4.49
0.648819 1988 $4.32 $4.58 $5.24
0.680975 1989 $3.55 $3.16 $4.99
0.705546 1990 $3.03 $2.66 $4.68
0.707012 1991 $2.97 $2.50 $4.74
0.711007 1992 $2.87 $2.45 $4.71
0.721422 1993 $2.76 $2.34 $0.00
0.730775 1994 $2.78 $2.56 $0.00
0.756914 1995 $3.82 $3.86 $0.00
0.77466 1996 $3.54 $3.12 $0.00
0.774154 1997 $3.07 $2.53 $4.13
0.754942 1998 $2.62 $2.21 $4.77
0.761262 1999 $2.80 $2.51 $4.93
0.805349 2000 $2.62 $2.02 $4.47
0.814146 2001 $2.73 $2.10 $4.18
0.79549 2002 $3.42 $3.22 $4.46
0.83801 2003 $3.38 $3.09 $4.24
0.889883 2004 $2.79 $2.38 $3.88
0.954952 2005 $2.65 $2.08 $3.82
1 2006 $2.85 $2.60 $3.55
**, PPI (all commodities), not seasonally adjusted, normalized on 2006  
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